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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The current thesis studies post-merger operational performance of European and North 
American ICT companies as well as its relation to the short-term stock performance around 
the merger announcement in the period from 2000 to 2011. The research was inspired by the 
working paper “Who wins the digitalized economy? Analysis of cross-Atlantic acquisitions” 
by Ikäheimo et al (2016). In the article, the researchers study the market reaction on the 
acquisition announcements in telecom sector and compare the obtained results between 
European, North American, and cross-Atlantic transactions. They claim that the market 
expectations on the European deals are lower than on the North American ones due to cross-
country differences of regulation of the ICT sector in the EU, which does not let the 
companies scale their operations. Therefore, the current thesis aims at complementing the 
abovementioned article by testing whether the European mergers are less successful in terms 
of the long-term operational performance and whether the market assesses the future changes 
in the operational efficiency correctly. 
 
Information and Communication Technologies sector (ICT) is defined by OECD (2002) as 
“a combination of manufacturing and service industries that capture, transmit and display 
data and information electronically”. Despite dramatic changes in technology since 2002, 
the definition of ICT, also often referred as telecom industry, is still valid among 
practitioners. ICT experienced a rapid growth in the beginning of the 21st century; according 
to OECD Information Technology Outlook (2010), the compound annual growth rate of the 
industry from 2000 to 2009 was 5,7% globally. The same source indicates that out of 250 
top ICT firms, 82 are located in the USA and Canada, and 51 are situated in Europe. Though 
Asia is becoming more and more important in the telecom industry, traditional regions, such 
as North America and Europe, still keep their positions as major players in the market. Apart 
from being a driver of change in the economy and people’s lifestyle, ICT is a large 
contributor in the GDP: the average annual growth of ICT investments’ contribution in GDP 
from 2000 to 2009 was 0,45% in the USA and 0,51% in the UK as opposed to 0,25% and 
0,33% for non-ICT investments respectively (OECD 2012). The mentioned aspects made 
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telecom an attractive industry to study, especially due to the fact that successful development 
of ICT is the factor facilitating growth and bringing transformation to the other industries.   
 
ICT is an active industry in mergers and acquisitions market: as reported by Institute of 
Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (2016), telecom is on the fifth place according to the 
value of transactions completed since 1985 (8,4% of the total value) following financials, 
energy and power, materials, and industrials. The combined value of transactions in the 
industry from 2000 to 2011 was 3 trillion USD globally. In addition, telecommunications 
represent 5,5% of the total deals announced from 2000 to 2016 according to transaction 
value, and the two largest mergers that occurred in the USA were between ICT companies 
(America Online acquiring Time Warner and Verizon Communications acquiring Verizon 
Wireless). The great activity in the M&A raises the question whether the acquisitions 
brought value to the industry. The topic of mergers and their effects on the companies’ stock 
returns and performance is widely discussed among academics and practitioners; however, 
ICT is not sufficiently studied in this respect.  
 
In the working paper presented on the 13th Workshop of Corporate Governance in Milan in 
2016, Ikäheimo et al (2016) raise an important problem of the ICT sector in the EU: the 
differences in regulation between the member states. They claim that multiplicity of 
regulation does not let the companies scale up their operations because the products should 
be tailored for distribution in different countries. Indeed, the operational environment for 
ICT firms in Europe seems to be hard for reaching the economies of scale due to, for 
instance, cross-border data flows restrictions (Miller and Atkinson 2014). This topic draws 
a great deal of attention, and a number of attempts, such as E-Privacy Directive, Enforcement 
Directive, Data Retention Directive, etc. have been made in order to align the legislation and 
build a pan-European framework (European Policy Centre 2010). However, the common 
view still is that the US environment is more favourable for telecom sector. Ikäheimo et al 
(2016) verify this hypothesis by estimating the stock price returns of the companies around 
the merger announcement; the findings indicate that the market reacts more positively on 
North American and cross-Atlantic transactions rather than European acquisitions. The 
obtained results are attributed to the scalability of products in the US and Canadian market. 
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Nevertheless, the stock returns do not provide a full picture of the mergers’ success. 
Therefore, the current paper focuses on long-term operational performance of the ICT firms 
following the acquisitions in the period from 2000 to 2011. The objective is to find out 
whether acquisitions are more beneficial for the performance of the North American 
companies and whether the market correctly reacts on the merger announcements and 
reflects the future changes in the operational efficiency in the stock price.  
 
Therefore, the hypotheses of the current research are: 
H1: Operational performance of North American companies improves more after the merger 
than the performance of European companies 
H2: Stock performance around the merger announcement is positively correlated with 
improvements in post-merger operational performance of the companies  
 
The methodology used to test the hypotheses is party based on the approach described by 
Healy et al (1992), though it enhances the latter with several new variables based on the 
newer studies (see e.g. Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2004; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2009; Cole and Vu, 2006). Operational performance of the 
companies is measured as industry-adjusted pretax operational cash flow returns on the 
market value of assets, where EBITDA serves as the proxy for the cash flows. The results 
are compared between the premerger period (years -5 to -1 before the acquisition) and the 
post-merger period (years 1 to 5 after the acquisition), and the abnormal cash flow return on 
assets is found from regressing the latter on the former returns. Year 0 is excluded from the 
analysis because it would make the data incomparable due to one-time acquisition costs as 
well as differences in the method of financing and merger accounting. Comparing the results 
between North America and Europe by adding the dummy variable for the company location 
allows testing Hypothesis 1. The equity performance is measured as total stock return 
including dividends from five days before the merger announcement to five days after the 
merger announcement and from five days before the merger announcement to the acquisition 
completion. The company returns are adjusted with the market returns in the US and Europe. 
The final step is regressing the stock price returns on the operational improvements after the 
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mergers to see if the market reflects the benefits of the transactions correctly and thus test 
Hypothesis 2.  
 
The rapid growth of the ICT sector does not only make the industry attractive for studying, 
but also poses a limitation for the research. Since telecom companies are active players in 
the M&A market, it is difficult to find the companies that engaged into acquisitions only 
once from 2000 to 2011. Therefore, it is possible that the operational performance of the 
sample firms in the years surrounding the mergers is affected by other acquisitions, which 
results in the data not being pure. However, the companies participated in mergers in 
different years with respect to the acquisitions studied in the current paper. In addition, a 
sufficient sample size and using median values to avoid large outliers should neutralize the 
effects of the other transactions.  
 
The thesis contributes to the existing literature on the topic in several ways. Firstly, it 
complements the current research on the benefits of mergers and acquisitions by studying it 
in the light of a relevant and rapidly developing industry, which recently started drawing 
attention of both academics and practitioners. Secondly, it enhances the existing studies of 
the telecom industry by adding a long-term perspective and examining the real gains from 
the acquisitions measured in operational performance. The existing research on the ICT 
sector is limited due to the industry being relatively new and peculiar as it also serves as a 
transformational platform for other businesses. Thirdly, it contributes to the event studies on 
stock returns around the merger announcements by verifying that the market reflects the 
future efficiency improvements. Lastly, the thesis compares the operational performance of 
North American and European companies, which, to the knowledge of the author, has not 
been done in the telecom industry yet. The thesis could be interesting for both academics 
and practitioners as it provides a view on M&As in one specific industry and helps ICT 
businesses in decision making regarding their process expansion. In addition, it could be 
relevant for investors and financial professionals evaluating enterprises for including in the 
portfolio.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2, Literature review, describes the existing research 
on the ICT sector and its trends as well the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the 
companies. Chapter 3, Data and Methods, introduces the sample used for the research and 
elaborates on the methodology utilized to test the hypotheses set. Chapter 4, Findings, 
demonstrates the results obtained and states whether the hypotheses are accepted. Chapter 
5, Discussion, explains the findings and analyzes the potential reasons behind the results. 
Finally, the last chapter presents the conclusions of the paper and possibilities for the further 
research.   
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter describes academic literature and practitioners reports on mergers and 
acquisitions. It starts with the overall benefits of mergers from the perspective of stock 
returns and operational performance. Thereafter, factors determining success or failure of 
the transactions from the viewpoint of researchers are discussed. Since the focus of the thesis 
is on the differences between European and North American acquisitions, a number of 
articles covering the peculiarities of the deals on these continents are reviewed. The chapter 
concludes with the characteristics of the ICT sector and the contribution of this thesis to the 
existing literature on it.  
 
2.1 Benefits of mergers and acquisitions 
 
2.1.1  Studies focusing on stock performance  
 
Benefits of mergers and acquisitions have been a widely discussed topic in the academic 
literature for decades. The most common view on it is that the target gains more from the 
acquisition than the bidder, while the combined benefit remains controversial. Naturally, the 
results depend on the methodology used in the study. A great deal of articles written on the 
topic utilize event study methodology in order to test whether acquisitions create value for 
shareholders. Event study methods imply measuring stock returns, typically around the 
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merger announcement date or on the effective date of the merger; the abnormal returns 
caused by the transaction are obtained by adjusting the company stock performance with the 
expected return using capital asset pricing model (CAPM) or with the market returns (Bruner 
2002). Extensive literature on this subject finds that target companies receive positive and 
statistically significant returns from the acquisitions (see e.g. Schwert, 1996; Eckbo and 
Thorburn, 2000; Leeth and Borg, 2000; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Campa and 
Hernando, 2004). For instance, Campa and Hernando (2004) claim that the short-term wealth 
effect of the merger is 9% for the target companies in a one-month window centered on the 
announcement date. These results are obtained using a sample of European transactions in 
1998-2000. Schwert (1996) finds an even higher return for the targets during the merger 
wave of 1920s: 26,3% using a time window from 42 days before the merger announcement 
to 126 days after it. Overall, scientists are virtually unanimous claiming that target firms get 
superior returns related to the acquisitions. Historical time period studied influences the 
returns; however, the positive conclusions with respect to target performance hold in various 
decades. 
 
Benefits of acquisitions for the acquirer side are a more controversial topic. The views on 
the value created from the transactions are polar: some researchers (see e.g. Kaplan and 
Weisbach, 1992; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Walker, 2000) find statistically significant 
negative returns around the merger announcement, some claim that the returns are positive 
(see e.g. Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Leeth and Borg, 2000; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004), 
while a number of researchers find no significant effect on the stock performance of the 
bidder (see e.g. Lyroudi et al, 1999; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Campa and Hernando, 
2004). While stock returns less than 1% do not seem to be economically significant, it is 
important to notice that they are generated in a time window of several days, which implies 
considerable annualized returns. Low or negative returns for the acquirer are often related to 
the premium paid to the target, which is documented by e.g. Bradley et al (1988), who prove 
that the number of bidders is negatively correlated with the acquirer returns, while it 
increases the gains for the target. If longer time frames are considered, the negative 
performance of the acquirer becomes more visible. As an example, Agrawal et al (1992) 
examine a five-year period following the mergers and claim that the bidders suffer 10% loss 
over that time. They state that the results are not caused by the slow stock price reversion or 
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market reaction adjustment on the transaction announcement, neither they are dependent on 
the potential errors in beta estimations. Therefore, the value destruction is caused by the 
market persistently considering the acquisitions to be negative for the companies’ future 
performance. Overall, it can be concluded that economic benefits of the mergers for the 
acquirers are dubious and not substantial enough from the point of view of a number of 
finance researchers. 
 
The fact that acquisitions frequently cause the value transfer from the acquirer to the target 
raises the question of economic benefits for the combined company. An important 
consideration in this case is that the bidders are typically much larger than the targets, which 
implies that a small loss for the former might not offset significant gains for the latter. In 
order to control for this factor, researchers often aggregate returns using a weighted average 
of them, where the weights are relative asset sizes, equity sizes, revenues, or other relevant 
items (Bruner 2002). Opinions on the value creation for the combined firm are not as 
controversial in the academic literature as the returns for the acquirers. In general, researches 
find statistically significant positive returns for the combined firm, though the exact values 
depend on the methods used and the peculiarities of the sample studied. For instance, Healy 
et al (1992) find a 9,1% return for the sample of 50 largest mergers in the US, while Kaplan 
and Weisbach conclude that the returns for the combined companies are 3,7% in mergers 
and tender offers. Both studies use a 10-day window around the transaction announcement 
(i.e. from day -5 to day +5) and refer to roughly the same historical time period: the former 
article uses the mergers registered from 1979 to mid-1984, while the latter one includes 
transactions from 1971 to 1982. In more recent studies, Mulherin and Boone (2000) report 
a statistically significant positive 3,6% aggregated return for the time window (-1, +1) 
centered on the merger announcement, and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find 4% 
combined returns from day -1 to the date of the announcement. Overall, the studies prove 
that the mergers create positive value for the combined firm, even if the benefits for the 
bidder are not so obvious.  
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2.1.2 Studies focusing on operational and financial performance 
 
Since stock performance around the merger announcement does not disclose the whole 
picture about the transaction success, some researchers prefer to study operational or 
financial performance after the acquisitions to see the real gains from it. The studies usually 
focus on such indicators as liquidity, profitability, growth rates, returns on assets, etc. several 
years after the acquisition (Bruner 2002). The results of these researches are not less 
controversial than the ones focusing on stock returns. Interestingly, the number of studies 
finding significant positive performance approximately equals the number of those finding 
significant negative performance, as well as the number of researches reporting no value 
creation or destruction. For instance, in the early studies, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) 
find that the acquirer companies which are highly profitable in the premerger period lose 
their profitability following the acquisitions. They explain their findings by the bidder’s loss 
of control over the operations as a result of the transactions. Therefore, difficulties related to 
managing a larger and more diversified company are presented as the main reason for value 
destruction. In contrary, Healy et al (1992) find significant positive efficiency improvements 
after acquisitions completed from 1979 to mid-1984. They claim that operational 
performance, measured as operational cash flow returns on assets, increases after the 
mergers and link it to the improvements in the asset turnover rather than cash flow margins. 
They report that combined companies generate more revenues on the unit of assets, which 
contradicts the results of the research by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989). Interestingly, 
Healy et al continue their research and publish an article in 1997 stating that in terms of 
operational cash flows, combined companies meet but do not exceed the premium paid for 
the target. Hence, the transactions are merely value conserving, implying a zero NPV project. 
In the newer studies, Ghosh (2001) finds the cash flows significantly increase following the 
mergers where the method of payment is cash and decline for stock-financed acquisitions. 
In case of financial performance, Rashid and Naeem (2017) study the sample of transactions 
from 1995 to 2012 and find that mergers do not have any significant effect on the 
profitability, leverage ratios, or liquidity of the companies. In addition, they claim that 
acquisitions negatively affect the quick ratio of the firms. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
operational and financial performance of the firms remains a controversial topic in the 
academic literature. This thesis contributes to the research on the subject by combining stock 
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performance and operational performance methodology, enhancing the sample with the 
comparison between Europe and North America, and focusing on a relevant and not widely 
covered in literature industry.  
 
2.1.3 Factors determining acquisitions success 
 
The fact that a large number of acquisitions destroy value for the shareholders or do not bring 
any abnormal returns brings up the topic of the factors determining the success of mergers. 
By “success”, I imply value creation in terms of either stock returns or operational 
performance after the transaction, or both. With respect to the reasons for the future 
improved or deteriorated performance, researches focus on several aspects: (1) diversifying 
versus focusing mergers; (2) acquiring a highly valued versus a low valued company; (3) 
paying with cash versus stock; (4) managers having a large versus small ownership of the 
company. Undoubtedly, there are more elements that could potentially influence the post-
merger performance, but the abovementioned aspects are most commonly mentioned.  
 
Diversification is often claimed to be the factor that destroys value for the shareholders and 
decreases the future operational performance of the company. Intuitively, it is reasonable 
since acquiring highly unrelated firms might make realizing synergies more difficult. In 
addition, it is commonly stated that industrial or geographical diversification of the company 
should not be beneficial for its equity holders for they can diversify their own portfolio 
without engaging in such risky projects as acquisitions.  There is a number of supporters for 
this argument among researchers and practitioners. For instance, Berger and Ofek (1995) 
find that the average decrease in value caused by diversification is between 13% and 15%, 
with the degree of business relatedness being positively correlated with the future returns. 
These findings are supported by a later study by DeLong (2003), who examines the factors 
potentially affecting the long-term performance of the companies and reports that the firms 
that stream their revenue flows after acquisitions perform superiorly. Santos et al (2008) 
study a sample of cross-border mergers and find that international diversification is not 
detrimental for the performance while industrial diversification destroys value. They claim 
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that unrelated mergers results in a 24% discount following the merger after controlling for 
the potential valuation errors of the target. Cole and Vu (2006) take a different approach and 
investigate the returns of unsuccessful merger bids, i.e. the ones that did not lead to the 
merger completion. They find that the announcement returns of the acquirer are not reversed 
after diversifying bids, while they are partially reversed after focusing bids. They argue that 
it supports the synergistic view on focusing acquisitions and agency problems theory of 
diversifying mergers. Alhenawi and Krishnaswami (2015) are in favor of the previous 
scientific research and state that Tobin’s Q and excess value is considerably higher after 
acquisitions of related companies than of unrelated firms. The researchers obtain these 
results on the sample of mergers completed between 1998 and 2007 and base their 
conclusions on the five-year post-merger period. However, the literature on corporate 
diversification is not unanimous. For instance, Schoar (2002) claims that in manufacturing 
industries, conglomerates have a higher productivity than stand-alone firms, and the trade 
discount of diversified companies partly stems from higher wages they pay. Moreover, she 
reports that conglomerates even improve their productivity after the mergers, though there 
is a temporary immediate effect of value transfer to the target companies. In addition, Doukas 
and Kan (2006) find that international diversification increases the value for bondholders 
while decreases returns for shareholders. Therefore, they argue that there is no detrimental 
effect on the performance caused by the acquisition, rather a value transfer. Overall, the vast 
majority of the articles on the subject are in favor of focusing transactions as opposed to 
diversifying ones. The present thesis does not include industry diversifying factor in the 
scope of the research since it focuses solely on the companies from telecom sector, which 
by definition implies related industries. International diversification is partly an influential 
aspect as European acquisitions in the sample are frequently cross-border, which poses an 
additional cultural and regulatory burden on the merging companies. The effects of 
international diversification will be discussed in more detailed in the following section of 
this chapter. 
 
Target valuation is also a widely discussed factor of merger success in the literature. It could 
influence the post-merger performance in two ways: (1) a high premium paid to the target 
might offset the potential efficiency improvements after the merger; and (2) if the target is a 
distressed company, the acquirer has an opportunity to improve its performance, hence 
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creating a substantial value for itself and the target. The studies measuring the premium paid 
to the target often focus on the number of bidders, fairly claiming that a high competition 
for the target might cause the winner to overpay, which is commonly referred to as “the 
winner’s curse” or “lemons problem”. For instance, Bradley et al (1988) prove that the 
number of bidders is negatively correlated with the acquirer returns, which in turn affects 
the total gains for the combined company. James and Wier (1987) draw similar conclusions 
when studying a sample of players in banking industry. The results of these researchers are 
rather intuitive, as a higher price paid should indeed make it more difficult to compensate 
for the costs by realizing synergies. As for overall target valuation and possible distressed 
state, the general opinion is that acquiring poorly managed and thus lower valued companies 
is beneficial for the future performance. For instance, Lang et al (1989) discover that 
combined, acquirer, and target returns are higher when the Tobin’s Q of the target is low, 
while the acquirer’s ratio is high. The results of the study are proved by Servaes (1991), who 
also verifies that they hold when controlled for other performance factors, such as the relative 
sizes of the acquirer and the target, the method of payment, the number of bidders, etc. The 
findings suggest that the combined performance of the companies is higher when the poorly 
managed firms are acquired by the well managed firms if Tobin’s Q is considered a measure 
of managerial skill. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) report similar effects of the high market-
to-book ratio of the target: high valuation of the target increases the premium paid, but causes 
a negative reaction in the bidder returns. If the companies are distressed, the viewpoints of 
the researchers are controversial. Clark and Ofek (1994) find that financial distress of the 
target positively correlates with the future performance, even though the bidders do not 
manage to completely restructure them. DeLong (2003) claims that in the banking industry, 
reducing bankruptcy costs with the merger facilitates a long-lasting performance 
enhancement. In contrary, Kruse et al (2007) find no proof to the abovementioned results: 
in their study, financial distress has no significant effect on the performance following the 
acquisition. Overall, a relatively low valuation of the target company is considered to be 
beneficial for the value creation in case of a merger. Even if financial distress, as an extreme 
case, remains controversial, acquisition of a poorly managed firm by a well-managed firm 
seems to be a positive factor for the future performance. The present thesis takes it into 
account by adding price-to-book ratios of the target and the acquirer as control variables into 
the regressions to see if the results hold also in the new sample. 
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The method of payment is a commonly studied factor influencing the success of the mergers 
as well. Typically, the studies oppose mergers financed with cash to mergers financed with 
stock. The reasoning behind it is that acquirers which prefer paying with stock usually do it 
when their company’s equity is overvalued. From this perspective, such mergers should be 
beneficial for the bidder, since it utilizes the potential of overvaluation, and harmful for the 
targets, since their shareholders do not receive an adequate payment. However, engaging 
into acquisitions with the primary purpose of utilizing overvalued stock may cause the 
bidders to merge with not the most suitable targets, which would lead to a value destruction. 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) find that in European acquisitions, financing the 
transaction with equity is followed by decreased returns for both the acquirer and the target. 
With respect to the acquirer returns separately, Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that in all-
stock transactions, bidders have abnormal returns of -24,2% in the five-year post-merger 
period, while the cash bidders earn 18,5% over the same time. These results, undoubtedly, 
affect the overall performance of the combined companies after the transaction. In addition, 
Cole and Vu (2006) find that during a three-day window around the merger announcement, 
bidders proposing an equity-financed transaction earn a cumulative abnormal return of -
4,24%, while the ones offering cash as a payment earn statistically significant positive 
returns. If the payment method is mixed, no significant returns are received. However, value 
destruction by overvalued firms is not an indisputable argument. Savor and Lu (2009) find 
that overvalued bidders that failed to complete the acquisition significantly underperform 
the ones who acquired a target. The result suggests that engaging into a merger when the 
stock is overvalued creates value for the bidders, though the performance of such companies 
is worse than of correctly valued firms that finance mergers with cash. Even though these 
results support the claim that utilizing overpriced equity generates value, it does not reject 
the results of the previous studies claiming that the method of payment influences the post-
merger performance. Overall, the general view on the method of payment is that cash-
financed deals create more value for the merged companies than stock-financed acquisitions. 
The present thesis considers this factor by adding dummy variables for the methods of 
payment in order to see the effects of them on the stock returns around the merger 
announcement and post-merger operational performance. 
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The final aspect of acquisitions’ success to be discussed in this chapter is management 
ownership of the company prior to engaging into mergers. The logic of the argument is that 
if the managers have more at stake, they are more cautious when initiating the merger process 
and selecting the target. Academics have various opinions on this subject. For instance, You 
et al. (1986) find that the bidder companies in which the manager has a low stake have a 
more negative announcement returns than the ones where the manager has a more substantial 
ownership. A more recent view on the topic refers to behavioral finance and implies that 
managers which have a large ownership in their own companies tend to be overconfident, 
which in turn leads to value destructing behavior with respect to mergers. For instance, 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) research the case of overconfident CEOs using a large 
investment in the company they are managing and the press portrayal as the proxy for 
overconfidence. They find that such CEOs are more likely to engage in merger activity (65% 
higher probability than for non-overconfident managers) and the market reaction on their 
acquisitions is considerably more negative (-0,9% as opposed to -0,12% in the case of non-
overconfident CEOs). In addition, Billett and Qian (2008) argue that CEOs’ net purchase of 
stock is lower prior to their first acquisition in comparison to their subsequent acquisitions. 
However, the market reaction on the subsequent mergers is considerably lower. Therefore, 
the factor of management ownership remains controversial in academic literature. While 
CEOs with high ownership stock in their companies have more at stake and are supposed to 
be more careful, such ownership portion might also signal of their overconfidence, which 
does not lead to value creating behavior.  
 
Overall, the most common factors influencing the success of the mergers are diversification, 
target valuation, method of payment, and management ownership. While the effects of 
diversification, valuation of target companies, and the method of financing are defined by 
the researches rather certainly, the influence of manager ownership in the company remains 
controversial. Undoubtedly, these are not the only determinants of performance; researchers 
also argue about the character of the bid (hostile versus friendly), sources of synergies, the 
level of regulation in the industry, and other factors. This chapter focuses only on the most 
common ones to give an overall overview of the M&A activity. In addition, the character of 
bid is irrelevant for the present thesis since the selected sample has only one hostile bid 
against 50 friendly bids. Therefore, studying the effects of this variable is impossible. The 
18 
 
level of regulation in the telecom sector is relatively high, which is discussed in the following 
sections of this chapter. Nevertheless, the effect of it is not studied separately since the 
industry is not compared to the overall acquisitions market. Therefore, the thesis 
complements the existing research on the factors of merger success by studying the impacts 
of the method of payment, the valuation of target and acquirer, and international 
diversification. 
 
2.2 Peculiarities of European and North American acquisitions 
 
While the overall benefits of mergers and acquisitions are widely covered in academic 
literature, the differences between North American and European mergers do not draw as 
much attention. The vast majority of the studies focuses on particular industries that have 
some distinctive characteristics on these continents and thus are attractive for researching. 
One problem to address when studying European and American acquisitions is cross-cultural 
differences. Even though European countries are united in the EU and have a free flow of 
goods and labor force nowadays, the member states still keep their unique cultural 
characteristics. This fact might create obstacles for future successful performance of merged 
companies, while it can also be a source of learning. Stahl and Voigt (2008) research whether 
cross-cultural differences prevent integration success or add value to the merged companies. 
They create an extensive model to test whether cultural differences affect synergy 
realization, short-term stock performance on the transaction announcement, long-term stock 
performance after the merger, and whether cross-cultural differences are more influential 
than organizational culture differences. They conclude that cultural differences negatively 
affect synergy realization, while they have no significant impact on the short-term stock 
price returns. As for the long-term performance, the effect is negative and statistically 
significant, but not substantial enough to be economically meaningful. The researchers also 
report that organizational differences are less important for synergy realization than cultural 
differences. Therefore, cross-border acquisitions may face an additional risk for the future 
performance. Another aspect that may be influential on the merger success is the degree of 
investor protection. Even though the researchers agree that shareholder rights and protection 
are a determinant of the stock returns, the exact effect remains controversial. Thus, Moeller 
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and Schlingemann (2005) report that in a sample of acquisitions involving a US bidder, there 
is a positive correlation between the bidder returns and the degree of investor protection in 
the target country. In addition, Danbolt and Maciver (2012) find that target companies gain 
more when they are acquired by the firms registered in the countries with a better investor 
protection. It can be concluded that targeting a low protection economy can be harmful for 
the bidders, but beneficial for the targets. However, Hagendorff et al (2008) examine a 
sample of companies in the banking sector and find that the degree of investor protection in 
the target country is negatively correlated with the acquirer returns. Hence, the lower the 
shareholder protection regime in the target economy, the more the bidder gains. They explain 
the results by the fact that the acquirer equity holders need a higher expected return on a 
more risky investment that they are engaging in. Therefore, there is no unanimous view 
among finance researchers on how the investor protection influences stock price returns and 
future performance of the merging companies. The present thesis does not include the degree 
of shareholder protection into the analysis.  
 
In general, empirical studies on the cross-border acquisitions provide mixed results. For 
instance, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) examine a sample of the US companies 
acquiring domestically and abroad. They find that cross-border acquisitions generate 
significantly lower returns for the acquirers than domestic mergers as well as are detrimental 
for the operating performance. On the contrary, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) study 
European acquisitions and argue that cross-border acquisitions are more beneficial than 
domestic ones in terms of returns. Moreover, Danbolt and Maciver (2012) report that cross-
border transactions where one side is registered in the UK are beneficial for both the target 
and the bidder with the cross-border positive effect of 10,1 and 1,5 percentage points on 
them respectively. Therefore, they argue that mergers abroad create value for both sides and 
are an opportunity rather than a threat for the shareholders. In a more detailed study, Campa 
and Hernando (2004) find that cross-border acquisitions lower the returns in regulated 
industries in Europe. This negative effect on returns is primarily caused by the lower returns 
of the target companies. Therefore, the results of the studies are somewhat controversial, 
though it can be concluded that the negative effects in cross-border transactions are partly 
caused by the differences in regulations between the countries. The foregoing discussion is 
very important for the present thesis as it aims at comparing European and North American 
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transactions, where cross-cultural differences are of essence. In addition, ICT sector is a 
relatively highly regulated industry, which will be discussed in the following chapter. In 
order to study the impact of cross-border transactions, a dummy variable for cross-border 
acquisitions is added to the regressions on the European sample.  
 
2.3 ICT sector in Europe and North America 
 
ICT sector is an industry that started drawing attention of the researchers and practitioners 
relatively recently. The most widely discussed issue in it is aligning regulation between 
countries and creating a single digital market. According to European Policy Centre (2010), 
European digital market still consists of 27 separate markets, partly due to policy differences. 
It can be illustrated by several examples: (1) cross-border online services in the EU represent 
only 5% of the Digital Market; (2) only 7% of small and medium enterprises in the industry 
sell cross-border; (3) small online companies that would like to sell their products abroad 
face on average €9000 extra expenditures for adapting to the national laws; and finally (4) 
57% of the companies claim that they would start or increase their selling abroad if the same 
laws regarding e-commerce were applied in all the countries of the EU (European 
Commission, 2015). These differences in e-regulation are claimed to be the reason why the 
telecom industry in Europe is lagging behind the American one. One of the most prominent 
examples of the national policies variety is the “data nationalism” laws. The purpose of this 
regulation is to create more protection for the users of online services; however, a great 
number of practitioners claim that the rules do not increase the data storage safety, while 
they pose a significant operational risk for the companies that are merging or expanding their 
operations abroad (Miller and Atkinson, 2014). The other commonly mentioned factors that 
could impede acquisition activity and international sales process are small-company 
preferences in Europe, data and land regulation, and managerial differences (Miller and 
Atkinson, 2014). The latter could be also classified as a cross-cultural difference, since 
leadership traditions in the country affect organizational culture. The concerns raised by 
practitioners are supported by academic studies on the subject: Campa and Hernando (2004) 
find that in heavily regulated industries, the acquisition announcement effect on returns is 
more negative than in less-regulated businesses in Europe. Therefore, the differences in 
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national policies may considerably decrease the benefits of mergers between companies. The 
current research by Ikäheimo et al (2016) supports this hypothesis by providing evidence 
that European companies gain significantly smaller returns around the merger announcement 
than their US peers; the effect is also seen in cross-Atlantic acquisitions since such mergers 
open access to the large and homogenous American market. However, to my knowledge, 
there is no research that studies long-term operational performance of telecom companies 
after mergers and compares it between Europe and North America. Therefore, the present 
thesis aims at contributing to the existing academic and practitioner literature on the subject. 
It adds a long-term perspective to the studies about telecom industry and tests whether the 
correlation between the real economic gains from the mergers and the short-term market 
reaction is positive. 
 
3 DATA AND METHODS 
 
In this chapter, the sample and methodology used for the research are described. The section 
introduces the bases for selecting the companies for the study and the sources of data. In 
addition, it elaborates on the variables used as well as the tests and robustness checks 
performed.  
 
3.1 Sample 
 
The sample for the present thesis consists of mergers and acquisitions that occurred in 28 
EU member states, the USA, and Canada between 2000 and 2010. The time frame is 
explained by the fact that the study is focused on the performance of the companies five 
years after the acquisitions; since data for 2017 could not be available, the latest values are 
collected from 2016. The deals registered between the companies in the current EU member 
states in the years prior to joining the European Union are excluded. In order to limit the 
focus to the ICT sector, the deals are filtered by the SIC code of the firms as defined by 
OECD (2002). In addition, the industries related to telecom according to the official SIC 
code website are added to the sample (http://siccode.com). The full list of SIC codes used in 
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this paper can be found in Appendix 1. Asset sales, spinoffs, and purchases of minority stakes 
are excluded from the sample; therefore, the research focuses solely on acquisitions of a 
majority interest or 100% acquisitions. The lists of North American and European 
transactions used in the study can be found in Appendices 2 and 3. 
 
The sample includes the transactions in which the enterprise value of the target company at 
the time of the acquisition was higher than 500 million USD. Selecting the largest deals for 
the research has several considerable advantages. First of all, the economic benefits of the 
acquisition are more significant and easier to detect if the company’s size is large. Secondly, 
the firms studied in the current paper are major market players and thus draw a great deal of 
attention from the investors. It implies that it is more probable that the market reaction on 
the merger would be noticeable and supposedly better reflecting the true value of the merger 
if the market is efficient. Thirdly, the performance of well-established corporations is 
presumed to be less affected by external factors as contrasted to small high-growth firms. 
Lastly, the largest telecom companies are less likely to be private, which leads to greater 
availability of the data for the study.   
 
Due to a number of companies not disclosing their financial statements or not being listed 
on the stock exchange at the time of the acquisition, the final sample consists of 51 deals. 
Out of this number, 24 mergers occurred within the European Union, and 24 took place in 
the USA or Canada. In some years, the number of observations is smaller since the data is 
not available for certain time periods. The initial information about all the deals registered 
between 2000 and 2011 is retrieved from the merge and corporate transaction database of 
Security Data Company (SDC). Financial statements of the companies, their stock 
performance, historical prices of indices (S&P500, S&P350 Europe, STOXX Europe 600 
Telecom, and S&P 500 Telecommunication services) as well as the mean industry values 
for EBITDA and market value of assets are obtained from Bloomberg Terminal database.  
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3.2 Methodology 
 
The methodology of this thesis is partly based on the article by Healy et al (1992), in which 
the authors studied post-merger operational performance of the US companies. However, 
the present paper also adds several control variables used in the more recent studies on the 
operational and stock performance (see e.g. Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Campa and 
Hernando, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009; Cole and Vu, 2006). In addition, it 
researches the short-term stock performance of the companies in the days surrounding the 
transaction, which makes the analysis deeper and more complete. Finally, the short-term 
market reaction on the acquisition is compared to the operational improvements of the 
companies following the transaction. 
 
3.2.1 Operational performance measurement 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, pretax operating cash flow returns on market value of assets 
are used to estimate the operational performance of the firms after the acquisitions. Healy et 
al (1992) define pre-tax operational cash flows as revenues less cost of goods sold less sales 
and administrative expenses plus goodwill and depreciation. Since not all the companies 
report these items separately in their financial statements, EBITDA is used as a proxy for 
the cash flows in the present paper. Similarly to the described operational cash flow variable, 
EBITDA is unaffected by the method of financing the transaction or method of accounting 
for the merger (purchase or pooling accounting) for it is not influenced by goodwill and 
depreciation changes, tax, and interest payments. EBITDA is deflated by the market value 
of assets, which is calculated as market value of common equity plus book value of preferred 
equity and hybrid capital plus book value of net debt. Market value of assets is a more 
suitable measure for the current research as opposed to book value of assets since it can be 
compared across companies and across time and is not affected by historical estimates. In 
line with Healy et al (1992) methodology, the value of common equity is estimated as of the 
beginning of the fiscal period in order to control for the effects of the company size changes 
during the year.  
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The changes in common equity at the merger announcement are excluded from market value 
of assets calculations. It is explained by the fact that in efficient markets, the future 
improvements in operating performance are reflected in the stock price moves after the 
merger announcement. If the cash flows after the merger increased due to the improved 
performance, the market would expect it and reflect it in the stock price on the transaction 
announcement; hence, the cash flow return on assets ratio would stay at its premerger levels. 
Therefore, the equity changes should be deducted in order to see the effects of the 
acquisition. The equity changes for the target and acquirer are measured from five days 
before the transaction announcement to the date of the merger. If the target was delisted from 
the stock exchange prior to the date when the deal became effective, the change in equity 
value is measured until the date of delisting. 
 
The study compares the operational cash flow returns on assets five years before the merger 
and five years after it. In order to avoid the effects of one-time acquisition costs as well as 
the method of accounting for the merger, the year of the transaction is excluded from the 
study. Since the timing of consolidating the financial reports is different for purchase and 
pooling methods of accounting (under purchase accounting, the financial statements are 
consolidated from the date of the merger, while under pooling accounting, the consolidation 
is from the beginning of the merger year), including the merger year would make the data 
incomparable across firms. In addition, the cash flows would be affected by the inventory 
write-ups and acquisition costs. Therefore, the years -5 to -1 before the merger are used for 
benchmarking, while the years 1 to 5 show how the performance changed after the 
transaction. In the years -5 to -1, EBITDA and market value of assets of the acquirer and the 
target are aggregated in order to get the premerger figures for combined firms. After the 
transaction, the actual values for the merged company are used for the analysis.  
 
In order to control for the market moves during the time period studied, the company values 
are industry adjusted. The adjustment is based on the methodology proposed by Healy et al 
(1992). It implies that the median values for the cash flow returns on assets of the telecom 
industry are subtracted from the company values. Since the companies from the sample are 
from different continents, the median values are collected separately for European and North 
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American telecom sectors. Therefore, European companies’ and North American 
companies’ returns are adjusted with the median cash flow returns of the European and North 
American telecom industries respectively. Median values are more appropriate to use in this 
case since in ICT industry, several large outliers may move the average values considerable. 
As the sample size for the study is not large and is prone to data skew, it is better to use 
median values in order to avoid the effects of the outliers. The data is retrieved from 
Bloomberg Terminal database. The adjustment allows controlling for contemporaneous 
external events affecting the industry as a whole and makes the results comparable across 
time. 
 
3.2.2 Stock performance measurement 
 
Operational performance results are accompanied with the stock price returns around the 
merger announcement and during the whole merger period. It is done in order to see if the 
market correctly reflects the future changes in the operational performance in the stock price. 
Short-term equity returns around the merger announcement are measured from five days 
prior to transaction announcement to five days after it. The longer time considered is the 
whole merger period, which implies the time from five days prior to the acquisition 
announcement to the date when the merger became effective. The variable used in the 
research is the total stock returns in the time frames mentioned, including dividends. The 
returns are adjusted for the market moves by deducting the market returns from the company 
returns, which allows capturing only the abnormal stock performance. The returns of the 
North American companies are adjusted with the S&P500 index, while the performance of 
the European companies is adjusted with the S&P350 European index. The data is found in 
Bloomberg Terminal database.  
 
Since the stock returns are calculated before the effective date of the mergers, the returns of 
the target and acquirer are aggregated. The combined returns are calculated as the weighted 
average of the returns of the target and acquirer, where the weights are the equity values of 
the respective companies prior to the merger announcement. The stock performance is 
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studied separately and thereafter regressed on the improvements in the operational 
performance in order to estimate the correlation between the efficiency changes after the 
mergers and the market reaction on the announcement of the transaction. In addition, control 
variables, such as the relative size of the target’s size to the acquirer’s size, price-to-book 
ratio of the target and the acquirer, method of payment, and dummy variables for American 
deals (in the total sample) and cross-border deals (in the European sample) are added. These 
new variables enhance the original methodology of Healy et al (1992) by implementing the 
newer methods (see e.g. Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2004; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2009; Cole and Vu, 2006). The character of the bid is 
disregarded in this study since only one bid out of 51 is hostile, while the others are friendly, 
which does not allow researching the impact of this variable. The regressions are explained 
in chapter Findings together with the results they provide. 
 
4 FINDINGS 
 
The following chapter presents the findings from the data described above. It explains the 
regressions used and the robustness checks performed. The results are firstly presented for 
the operational performance and thereafter for the stock performance of the companies. The 
chapter concludes with comparing the stock price returns on the acquisition announcement 
with the operational improvements and demonstrates the differences in the market reaction 
on the North American and European transactions. 
 
4.1 Operational performance of the total sample group 
 
As described in the methodology chapter above, the post-merger operational performance is 
measured as pretax operational cash flow return on market value of assets, where EBITDA 
serves as the proxy for pretax operating cash flows. Table 1 shows the median returns for 
the sample firms both in Europe and in North America. Column 1, Firm median, indicates 
non-adjusted median returns on assets for the companies in years -5 to -1 and 1 to 5. Column 
2 presents the industry-adjusted returns, i.e. the company returns less the median values for 
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the cash flow returns on assets of the telecom industry. Since the companies from the sample 
are from different continents, the median values are collected separately for European and 
North American telecom sectors. Therefore, European companies’ and North American 
companies’ returns are adjusted with the median cash flow returns of the European and North 
American telecom industries respectively. The total figure for the median premerger 
performance is obtained the following way: the median value for the years -5 to -1 is 
calculated for every firm in the sample, after which the median of those companies’ returns 
is obtained. The median post-merger performance is calculated the same way. 
 
Year relative to 
the merger Firm median 
Industry adjusted   
Median % Positive 
Number of 
observations 
-5 12,4% -5,1% 29% 42 
-4 12,1% -6,2% 33% 42 
-3 14,5% -8,5% 29% 45 
-2 15,9% -5,2% 33% 50 
-1 14,1% -7,1% 39% 51 
     
Median 
premerger 
performance 
13,6% -7,8% 40% 45 
     
1 15,2% 0,9% 55% 51 
2 15,9% -0,9% 45% 51 
3 17,7% 2,9% 59% 51 
4 16,8% 2,1% 65% 51 
5 16,4% 0,9% 51% 51 
     
Median post-
merger 
performance 
16,5% 1,4% 60% 51 
     
Table 1. Median operating cash flow return on market value of assets of 51 combined 
acquirer and target European and North American companies in the years surrounding the 
mergers completed in 2000-2011 
 
Based on Table 1, the companies in the sample demonstrated an improved performance 
following acquisitions. The median premerger operational cash flow returns on assets are 
negative in each of the five years studied. In the post-merger period, the returns are positive 
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in all the years except for year 2. The percentage of positive industry-adjusted returns is 
considerably higher after the mergers as well, 60% ex-post value in comparison to the 40% 
ex-ante one.  
 
In order to test whether there is a change in the operational performance of the companies 
following the merger, the following cross-sectional regression is used:  
 
(1) IACRpost,i = α+ β1 IACRpre,i  + β2 Valuei + β3 Americani + β4 Target sizei +  
+ β5 Target P/Bi + β6 Acquirer P/Bi + β7 Stocki + β8 Mixedi + εi , 
 
where IACRpost,i is the median pretax operational cash flow return on assets of the company 
i in the years 1 to 5, IACRpre,i  is the median premerger return for the same company, Valuei 
is the value of the transaction, Americani is a dummy variable representing that the 
transaction occurred between the companies located in North America, Target sizei is the 
relative size of the target’s market value of assets to the acquirer’ assets, Target P/Bi is the 
price-to-book ratio of the target, Acquirer P/Bi is the price-to-book ratio of the acquirer, 
Stocki is a dummy variable meaning that the transaction was financed by stock, and Mixedi 
is a dummy variable for the mixed method of payment. The dummy variables include only 
Stock and Mixed since paying with cash is the most frequently used method, which is hence 
utilized as the base case to avoid multicollinearity. Even though the methodology chapter 
explains why the selected measure of operational performance is not directly affected by the 
method of payment, there might be indirect effects regarding the choice of the method, such 
as e.g. overvaluation of the acquirer’s stock, leading to inferior performance. The variables 
IACRpost,i and IACRpre,i  are the ones used by Healy et al (1992) in their research, while the 
control variables are the ones used in newer finance studies (see e.g. Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009; Cole and 
Vu, 2006). The measure of the abnormal industry-adjusted return is α, while coefficients β 
measure the effects of the abovementioned variables on the post-merger return.  
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The result of regression (1), which includes the total sample of 51 European and North 
American acquisitions, is the following (t-values are presented in parentheses): 
 
IACRpost,i = -0,4%+ 0,02 IACRpre,i  + 0,00001 Valuei + 0,01 Americani +  
         (-0,24)  (0,35)                 (0,69)       (0,28) 
+ 0,05 Target sizei + 0,0001 Target  P/Bi – 0,00001Acquirer P/Bi – 0,02Stocki - 
   (2,08)           (0,28)   (-0,23)     (-0,6) 
-0,05 Mixedi  
 (-2,26) 
 R-squared = 0,20, F-statistic = 1,33 
 
It implies that premerger returns have a slight positive effect on the post-merger cash flow 
returns on assets of the companies, while the abnormal decrease in performance is -0,4% 
The fact that the transaction occurred between the companies located in the US or Canada 
affects the post-merger returns positively, though insignificantly, which does not allow 
accepting Hypothesis 1. The value of the transaction and the price-to-book ratios of the target 
and the acquirer have a very low effect on the post-merger performance. As expected from 
the studies of the method of payment effects, financing the transaction with stock or both 
cash and stock negatively correlates with the future performance. However, only the 
variables Target size and Mixed are statistically significant on 5% level, and overall the 
regression has a relatively low explanatory value since R squared is 0,2, and F-statistic is 
1,33 with 0,26 significance. Therefore, the probability that the results are obtained solely by 
chance is 26%, which is rather high. Therefore, no reliable conclusions may be drawn based 
on the regression on the total sample of the companies. The following section presents the 
results of the returns comparisons and regressions including North American companies 
only. 
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4.2 Operational performance of North American companies 
 
Since the study focuses on comparing the operational performance of North American and 
European companies, it was decided to check the pretax operational cash flow returns on 
assets of the US and Canadian companies separately from the European ones. The results 
are presented in Table 2.  
 
Year relative to 
the merger Firm median 
Industry adjusted   
Median % Positive 
Number of 
observations 
-5 14,8% 4,6% 56% 21 
-4 13,9% -1,9% 44% 22 
-3 14,8% -8,7% 26% 24 
-2 16,9% -7,2% 26% 26 
-1 15,4% -7,1% 33% 27 
     
Median 
premerger 
performance 
14,6% -4,8% 40% 24 
     
1 16,0% -0,9% 48% 27 
2 16,1% -4,9% 37% 27 
3 17,9% 0,7% 52% 26 
4 16,8% 1,3% 56% 26 
5 17,4% 1,3% 56% 25 
     
Median post-
merger 
performance 
16,5% -0,1% 40% 26 
     
Table 2. Median operating cash flow return on market value of assets of 27 combined 
acquirer and target North American companies in the years surrounding the mergers 
completed in 2000-2011 
 
In comparison with the figures obtained from the total sample, the performance 
improvements following the mergers are not so considerable. The non-adjusted median 
returns on assets increased from 14,6% to 16,5% after the acquisitions, while the industry-
adjusted returns rose from -4,8% to -0,1%. The return on assets in year -5 is an outlier since 
it is high (4,6%); the returns in the following premerger years are negative. In the post-
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merger period, the industry returns are higher than company returns in years 1 and 2, after 
which the sample companies outperform the industry. The overall percentages of positive 
industry-adjusted returns prior to and following the acquisitions are the same. 
 
The abnormal industry-adjusted returns are estimated with the regression that is similar to 
regression (1), excluding the variable American. Therefore, regression (2) is the following:  
 
(2) IACRpost,i = α+ β1 IACRpre,i  + β2 Valuei + β3 Target sizei + β4 Target P/Bi +  
+ β5 Acquirer P/Bi + β6 Stocki + β7 Mixedi + εi  
 
The regression is based on the methodology used by Healy et al (1992) as well as newer 
methods used in financial studies (see e.g. Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Campa and 
Hernando, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009; Cole and Vu, 2006). The results of 
regression (2), which includes the sample of 27 acquisitions between North American firms, 
is presented below (t-values are in parentheses): 
 
IACRpost,i = 3%+ 0,005 IACRpre,i  + 0,000002 Valuei + 0,02 Target sizei –  
        (0,78)  (0,08)   (0,22)         (0,58) 
- 0,004 Target P/Bi – 0,003 Acquirer P/Bi – 0,03 Stocki – 0,08 Mixedi  
  (-1,25)  (-0,16)   (-0,68)           (-2,46) 
 R-squared = 0,38, F-statistic = 1,63 
 
According to the values obtained, the abnormal industry-adjusted return is positive, which 
implies that the performance of the companies strengthens after the acquisitions. In addition, 
there is a positive, though insignificant correlation between the premerger and post-merger 
returns on assets. In line with the results of the total sample, the value of transaction as well 
as the price-to-book ratios of the targets and acquirers have a very slight and statistically 
insignificant effect on the post-merger performance. In addition, the target size is positively 
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correlated with the post-merger returns, while paying with stock or using a mixed method of 
payment is less favourable than paying with cash. The effects of the method of payment are 
in line with the results of the previous studies (see e.g. Martynova and Renneboog, 2009; 
Cole and Vu, 2006). However, only the coefficient of the Mixed payment is statistically 
significant. The regression based on the North American transactions has a higher 
explanatory value than the one based on the total sample. R squared is 0,38 and F-statistic is 
1,63 with 0,19 significance. Therefore, the regression on the American acquisitions is more 
significant than regression (1) based on all the companies in the sample, though it still does 
not allow drawing strong conclusions on the research question. The following section 
presents the findings with respect to European acquisitions.  
 
4.3 Operational performance of European companies 
 
In contrast with the total sample and North American companies, European firms 
demonstrate a superior performance after the mergers. Median pretax operating cash flow 
returns on assets are presented in Table 3. The improvement in non-adjusted returns is 
moderate: the median returns increase from 12,3% to 16,1% following the acquisition. The 
industry-adjusted returns grow much more considerably, from -16,9% in the premerger 
period to 2,0% after the transaction. In addition, the returns of the companies are lower than 
the median returns of the telecom sector in years -5 to -1, while in years 1 to 4 the sample 
firms tend to outperform the industry. The percentage of positive observations substantially 
increases after the transactions as well, from the median of 20% before the merger to 60% 
in the years following the deal.  
 
In order to measure the abnormal post-merger industry-adjusted return, regression (3) is 
used, which is similar to regression (2) described in the previous section of this chapter, but 
adds a dummy variable Cross-Border implying an acquisition between the companies in two 
different countries in Europe. Therefore, regression (3) is: 
 
(3) IACRpost,i = α + β1 IACRpre,i  + β2 Valuei + β3 Target sizei + β4 Target P/Bi +  
+ β5 Acquirer P/Bi + β6 Stocki + β7 Mixedi + β8 Cross-Borderi + εi  
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Year relative to 
the merger Firm median 
Industry adjusted   
Median % Positive 
Number of 
observations 
-5 6,8% -59,8% 0% 15 
-4 10,4% -25,9% 21% 15 
-3 13,9% -6,6% 33% 18 
-2 15,1% -0,8% 42% 23 
-1 13,7% -8,1% 46% 24 
     
Median 
premerger 
performance 
12,3% -16,9% 20% 18 
     
1 15,0% 1,8% 63% 24 
2 15,6% 1,3% 54% 24 
3 17,7% 6,0%7 67% 24 
4 16,7% 2,9% 75% 24 
5 15,7% -0,6% 46% 24 
     
Median post-
merger 
performance 
16,1% 2,0% 60% 24 
     
Table 3. Median operating cash flow return on market value of assets of 24 combined 
acquirer and target European companies in the years surrounding the mergers completed in 
2000-2011 
 
The coefficients obtained are presented below (t-values are in parenthesis): 
 
IACRpost,i = -1% + 0,08 IACRpre,i  + 0,000001 Valuei + 0,04 Target sizei +  
         (-0,41)  (0,97)  (0,93)         (0,85) 
+ 0,00001 Target P/Bi + 0,00001 Acquirer P/Bi + 0,02 Stocki – 0,02 Mixedi –  
   (0,19)      (0,15)           (0,49)       (-0,39) 
- 0,01 Cross-Borderi 
 (-0,27) 
R-squared = 0,20, F-statistic = 0,46 
 
According to the results, the abnormal return following the acquisitions between European 
companies is -1%. The correlation between the returns in years -5 to -1 and 1 to 5 is positive 
34 
 
0,08, which is stronger than for American companies. Similarly to the previous results, the 
value of the transaction and price-to-book ratios do not have a significant effect on the post-
merger performance. In addition, the relative target size to the acquirer is positively 
correlated with the returns after the acquisition, while the mixed method of payment has a 
negative effect. Interestingly, in the European sample, paying with stock positively 
influences the post-merger performance, which is different from the North American sample. 
However, none of the coefficients obtained is statistically significant, which makes it 
difficult to draw reliable conclusions based on the values. Even though the direction of the 
variables is consistent with Hypothesis set in the Introduction chapter, it is impossible to 
accept it due to the low statistical significance of the corresponding coefficient. The 
following chapter will present the robustness checks to the abovementioned regressions and 
demonstrate that the obtained values are correct at least in direction. 
 
4.4 Robustness checks for operational performance 
 
4.4.1 Industry definitions 
 
Pretax operational cash flow returns on assets in this study are adjusted with the median 
industry returns in order to control for external contemporaneous events in the telecom 
sector. However, the industry median values could be dependent on the industry definitions 
and could be biased if the sample size is not enough. Therefore, the results are verified based 
on the median values of the whole market in the same time period. In line with the previous 
methodology, the returns for the North American and European companies are adjusted with 
the median values of the North American and European market respectively. The data on the 
market values is retrieved from Bloomberg Terminal database. 
 
The results of this sensitivity analysis are similar for the total sample, North American, and 
European transactions. The market median returns on assets are higher than the company 
returns: the market-adjusted returns are negative in all the years in every sample studied. 
When all the 51 companies are considered, the median premerger return on assets is -12,1%, 
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and the post-merger one is -6,4%. Running regression (1) on the total sample using market-
adjusted returns instead of industry-adjusted returns provides very similar results in terms of 
the coefficients values, but much stronger in terms of significance. The result of regression 
are the following (t-values are presented in parentheses): 
 
MACRpost,i = -6%+ 0,02 MACRpre,i  + 0,00004 Valuei + 0,02 Americani +  
         (-3,53)  (2,4)                     (0,72)        (1,25) 
+ 0,18 Target sizei + 0,03 Target  P/Bi – 0,00002 Acquirer P/Bi – 0,01Stocki + 
   (1,51)           (0,12)   (-0,70)     (-0,67) 
+ 0,01 Mixedi  
   (0,32) 
 R-squared = 0,25, F-statistic = 1,73 
 
Here, MACR implies market-adjusted returns, while all the other variables remain 
unchanged from regression (1). All the coefficients are the same in direction as the ones 
based on the industry-adjusted returns except for the coefficient for Mixed method of 
payment, which is insignificant in both cases. In addition, most coefficients are very similar 
in value. Furthermore, the intercept is statistically significant on the 1% level, while the 
correlation between the premerger and post-merger performance is significant on the 5% 
level. The overall quality of the regression is higher as well with the significance of F-
statistic being 0,12. Therefore, the test verifies that the values obtained from the industry-
adjusted returns are robust. However, the coefficient for the variable “American” remains 
not statistically significant (p-value = 0,22), which means that Hypothesis 1 cannot be 
accepted.  
 
For the sample consisting of solely North American companies, the premerger median 
operational cash flow return on asset is -8,3%, while the post-merger one is -4%. The result 
of regression (2) based on the market-adjusted returns is the following:  
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MACRpost,i = -0,4% + 0,13 MACRpre,i  + 0,000001 Valuei – 0,03 Target sizei –  
            (-0,21)  (3,71)        (1,37)    (-1,43) 
- 0,002 Target P/Bi – 0,01 Acquirer P/Bi + 0,01 Stocki + 0,005 Mixedi  
  (-0,99)  (-0,75)            (0,26)           (0,32) 
 R-squared = 0,49, F-statistic = 2,60 
 
The result of regression (2) run on the market-adjusted returns is similar to the one based on 
the industry-adjusted data. Nevertheless, there are some interesting differences. The 
abnormal return after the merger turned negative after checking the market-adjusted values; 
the same happened to the coefficient of the relative size of the target to the acquirer. It is 
surprising that the coefficients for the stock and mixed methods of payment are positive, 
which implies that paying with cash is worse for the future operational performance of the 
companies than financing otherwise. However, it is important to note that these coefficients 
are not statistically significant and thus do not allow drawing reliable conclusions. The only 
significant coefficient is the correlation between the premerger and post-merger operational 
cash flows, which holds at the 1% level. Overall, the F-statistic of the regression has a 0,05 
significance, which is a good result, but the low absolute values of the corresponding t-tests 
do not allow comparing the abnormal returns of the North American companies with the 
European ones reliably.  
 
For the European transactions, premerger median EBITDA returns on assets are -10,03%, 
and the post-merger returns are -6,97%. These values suggest that the performance of the 
companies improves after the acquisition. If a closer look is taken on the drivers of the 
differences, the results of regression (3) based on the market-adjusted returns are the 
following: 
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MACRpost,i = -7,8% - 0,39 MACRpre,i  + 0,000001 Valuei + 0,02 Target sizei +  
         (-2,19)  (-1,45)      (0,59)  (0,51) 
+ 0,0004 Target P/Bi - 0,0002 Acquirer P/Bi - 0,06 Stocki – 0,04 Mixedi –  
   (0,97)  (-0,79)            (-1,87)  (-0,94) 
- 0,05 Cross-Borderi 
 (-1,78) 
R-squared = 0,41, F-statistic = 1,30 
 
The results of the regression above are similar to the ones of the regression based on the 
industry-adjusted returns, though with a number of nuances. The correlation between 
premerger and post-merger performance is negative, though not statistically significant. In 
addition, the correlation between the post-merger returns and the acquirer price-to-book ratio 
turns negative, which is unexpected, but also statistically insignificant, thus not allowing 
drawing reliable conclusions regarding the effects. In line with the previous studies claiming 
that payment with cash is associated with a superior performance versus stock, the 
coefficients for stock and mixed methods of payment are negative. Moreover, the impact of 
the cross-border acquisition as opposed to the domestic one is negative, which is significant 
at the 10% level and consistent with the findings by other researchers (see e.g. Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005). The most important finding here is the negative and statistically 
significant on the 5% level decrease in operational performance following the mergers 
between European companies represented by α. The value is considerably lower than the 
abnormal return of the North American companies. However, even though the values are 
directionally in line with Hypothesis 1 stating that post-merger operational performance of 
American companies are higher than the one of the European companies and the coefficient 
of the abnormal return for the European sample is statistically significant, the lack of 
significance in the North American sample does not allow accepting Hypothesis 1.  
 
4.4.2 Fluctuations in the equity values 
 
Measuring the operational performance with EBITDA returns on the market value of assets 
implies the risk that the results are biased due to fluctuations in the equity values. If the 
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market expects the merger to be detrimental for the company performance, it reflects the 
sentiments in the stock price, and vice versa. Deducting the equity changes from five days 
before the merger announcement until the acquisition completion day from the total value 
of assets as described in the methodology chapter controls for short-term market reactions. 
However, if the negative expectations regarding the company efficiency in comparison with 
its industry persist, this adjustment is not sufficient. Therefore, it is decided to verify the 
results by comparing the annual stock returns of the sample companies and the telecom 
sector. The equity performance is measured for the years -5 to -1 and 1 to 5.  Median industry 
changes in common equity are deducted from the firm medians in order to get industry-
adjusted values. Using the differences in the common equity values is more suitable than 
simply taking the telecom index returns because the idiosyncratic company cash flow returns 
on assets are also calculated with the common equity changes and not solely the stock price 
growth. The results are presented in Table 4.  
 
Year relative to the merger Total sample North America Europe 
-5 -21,0% -18,7% -24,5% 
-4 -21,3% -13,6% -33,9% 
-3 -17,6% -9,5% -34,8% 
-2 -10,6% -10,7% 8,2% 
-1 -6,6% -0,5% -21,6% 
1 
2 
3 
 -13,2% -14,6% -19,8% 
 -19,1% -13,0% -31,0% 
 -0,3% -5,1% -1,3% 
4 -13,2% -10,6% -10,2% 
5 -13,1% -0,9% -34,0% 
Table 4. Median industry-adjusted common equity growth rates of 51 combined acquirer 
and target North American and European companies in the years surrounding the mergers 
completed in 2000-2011 
 
According to Table 4, there is no consistency in the stock return patterns before or after the 
mergers. The vast majority of the industry-adjusted returns are negative, which indicates that 
the shares of the sample companies performed worse than the telecom sector in the given 
years. This result is reasonable since the merger transactions in the selected sample are 
among the largest ones registered from 2000 to 2011. Therefore, the stock returns of such 
well-established firms are typically lower than the returns of young growing companies. ICT 
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sector experienced a rapid growth in the years studied, implying that a great number of small 
fast-growing businesses entered the field during that time period. The industry median 
common equity values may be affected by the stock returns of those businesses, which 
explains why the industry common equity grew faster than the equity of the sample firms. 
From Table 4, it is clear that the common equity of the sample firms does not persistently 
underperform or outperform after the acquisitions in comparison to the premerger period, 
which implies that the cash flow returns on market value of assets are not biased upwards or 
downwards in the previously conducted regressions. Therefore, the results of the operational 
performance studies are robust with respect to equity fluctuations.  
 
In order to verify if the common equity values growth data is reliable, the stock returns of 
the sample companies in the years surrounding the mergers are also adjusted with the 
telecom indices growth in the corresponding time period. The returns of the European 
companies are adjusted with the STOXX Europe 600 Telecom index, while the stock returns 
of the North American companies are adjusted with the S&P500 Telecommunication 
Services index. Thus, the median index returns are deducted from the median company stock 
price returns; thereafter, median values of industry-adjusted stock returns are obtained for 
each year. The results are presented in Table 5. 
  
Year relative to the merger Total sample North America Europe 
-5 3,5% 6,1% 3,4% 
-4 8,4% 4,1% -4,9% 
-3 -3,3% -3,0% -7,7% 
-2 4,2% 0,9% 5,8% 
-1 5,9% 6,4% 5,4% 
1 
2 
3 
 2,7% 5,1% -5,0% 
 2,2% 2,6% -2,5% 
 9,0% 1,9% 4,6% 
4 -0,9% -2,4% 3,2% 
5 -4,3% 6,5% 2,9% 
Table 5. Median industry-adjusted stock returns of 51 combined acquirer and target North 
American and European companies in the years surrounding the mergers completed in 2000-
2011 
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According to Table 5, there is no visible change in the post-merger returns as opposed to the 
premerger stock performance. In addition, the sample companies do not persistently 
underperform or outperform the indices unlike the median common equity changes in the 
industry since the firms included into the indices are of similar size as the sample ones. This 
result supports the previous statement that the median common equity values of the whole 
telecommunication industry are affected by small high-growth enterprises. The values in the 
table allow claiming that the operational performance results are not obtained due to 
significant changes in the companies’ equity valuation after the mergers. Therefore, they are 
robust and hold after controlling for the equity fluctuations.  
 
4.5 Stock performance  
 
As described in the methodology chapter, the short-term stock performance of the companies 
is measured from five days prior to the merger announcement to five days after it in order to 
see if the market reaction on the acquisitions is positive. The longer time period considered 
is from five days prior to the merger announcement until the merger completion; the latter 
time frame is consistent with the methods used by Healy et al (1992). The stock performance 
of the sample companies is adjusted with the market returns. In line with the previous tests, 
the equity returns of North American and European companies are adjusted with North 
American and European market (S&P500 and S&P350 Europe indices) respectively. The 
results are presented in Table 6; Panel A demonstrates the stock performance of the whole 
sample, while Panels B and C focus on the North American and European transactions 
separately. 
 
The results demonstrated in Table 6 are consistent with the vast research regarding mergers 
and acquisition claiming that targets on average gain more from the merger than the 
acquirers. The effect is more noticeable in the longer time frame, i.e. during the time from 
the merger announcement until its completion presented in the section “Merger period”. In 
addition, the market reacts more positively on the acquisitions completed in the USA and 
Canada rather than Europe: the average stock return in the merger period is 2,5% in North 
America as opposed to -6,8% in Europe. The result is in line with the findings presented in 
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the working paper by Ikäheimo et al (2016), who claim that European telecom acquisitions 
generate less equity returns around the merger announcement. In the current sample, the 
difference is not so clear in the short term; nevertheless, it becomes considerable in the longer 
period. The obtained results suggest that the market reaction is positively correlated to the 
operational efficiency improvements described in the previous sections of this chapter. 
However, verifying this statement and testing Hypothesis 2 requires a more thorough 
research presented in the next section. 
 
Panel A: Total sample 
  Merger announcement Merger period 
 Target Acquirer Combined Target Acquirer Combined 
Average 14,0% -2,2% -0,2% 14,2% -5,0% -1,8% 
First quartile 1,8% -5,0% -3,0% -1,5% -13,8% -12,0% 
Median 9,3% -1,3% 0,8% 13,8% -0,6% 1,3% 
Third quartile  19,2% 1,6% 2,6% 30,9% 4,9% 11,2% 
Panel B: North American acquisitions 
  Merger announcement Merger period 
 Target Acquirer Combined Target Acquirer Combined 
Average 20,8% -2,8% -0,4% 24,4% -1,3% 2,5% 
First quartile 5,1% -5,2% -2,5% 4,8% -7,6% -6,7% 
Median 13,7% -1,4% -0,2% 23,1% 0,2% 2,5% 
Third quartile  27,0% 1,2% 2,5% 37,3% 4,3% 12,8% 
Panel C: European acquisitions 
  Merger announcement Merger period 
 Target Acquirer Combined Target Acquirer Combined 
Average 6,1% -1,6% 0,1% 2,2% -9,5% -6,8% 
First quartile 1,7% -4,1% -3,5% -7,3% -27,9% -19,7% 
Median 5,8% -0,1% 1,1% 3,5% -4,5% -4,5% 
Third quartile  14,1% 1,9% 2,5% 13,8% 4,7% 8,9% 
Table 6. Market-adjusted stock returns for target, acquirer, and combined companies around 
the merger announcement and during the merger period for acquisitions completed from 
2000 to 2011 
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4.6 Relation between operational performance and stock performance 
 
Comparing the short-term stock performance with the post-merger operational performance 
provides a new angle to the article by Healy et al (1992), who only considered the cash flow 
returns after the acquisition and the equity returns in period until the merger completion. In 
addition, it enhances the historical study with opposing North American and European 
results. Moreover, the current paper completes the working paper by Ikäheimo et al (2016), 
who focused on the stock price performance in a three-day window around the merger 
announcement but did not research the operational improvements after the transactions in 
the telecom industry. In order to see if the stock price returns correctly reflect the direction 
of the future cash flow returns on assets, the following regression on the total sample is 
conducted: 
 
(4) MASRi = α+ β1 OIi + β2 Valuei + β3 Americani + β4 Target sizei +  
+ β5 Target P/Bi + β6 Acquirer P/Bi + β7 Stocki + β8 Mixedi + εi , 
 
where MASRi is market-adjusted stock return of the combined company i, α  is the intercept, 
OIi is the operational improvement after the merger for the company i, Valuei is the value of 
the transaction, Americani is a dummy variable representing that the transaction occurred 
between the companies located in North America, Target sizei is the relative size of the 
target’s market value of assets to the acquirer’ assets, Target P/Bi is the price-to-book ratio 
of the target, Acquirer P/Bi is the price-to-book ratio of the acquirer, Stocki is a dummy 
variable meaning that the transaction was financed by stock, and Mixedi is a dummy variable 
for the mixed method of payment. The dummy variables include only Stock and Mixed since 
paying with the cash is the most frequently used method, which is hence utilized as the base 
case to avoid multicollinearity. Since the stock performance is considered before the merger, 
the stock returns of the target and acquirer are aggregated; the return of the combined 
company is a weighted average of the returns of the target and acquirer where the weights 
are the equity values of the companies prior to the merger announcement. Operational 
improvement is the difference between the company median cash flow returns on assets in 
the years 1 to 5 and -5 to -1. The median cash flow returns in the premerger period are the 
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same as the ones described in the previous regressions. Therefore, the operational cash flow 
returns of the companies are firstly measured for the years -5 to -1 and weighted with the 
respective market values of assets in the year -1 in order to find the combined values. 
Thereafter, the median of the returns for the years -5 to -1 is obtained for each combined 
company. 
 
Running regression (4) on the total sample on the short-term stock returns around the merger 
announcement provides the following results (t-values are presented in parenthesis): 
 
MASRi = -0,3% +0,21 OIi + 0,000001 Valuei + 0,001Americani +0,02 Target sizei+  
     (-0,2)    (1,676)  (0,25)        (0,04)  (1,19) 
+ 0,001 Target P/Bi – 0,0001 Acquirer P/Bi – 0,05 Stocki – 0,01Mixedi 
   (2,54)  (-0,53)      (-2,23) (-0,49) 
 R-squared = 0,28, F-statistic = 2,00 
 
According to the obtained values, the operational improvement of the companies after 
mergers is positively correlated with the short-term market reaction on the merger 
announcement, while the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. The level of significance 
is not low; however, given the small size of the sample, it is satisfactory. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 can be accepted. The abnormal market reaction on the merger announcement 
after controlling for the certain acquisition characteristics is negative, though not statistically 
significant. Value of the transaction, price-to-book ratios of the target and acquirer are not 
influential on the stock price performance. In line with the previous studies on the market 
return dependence on the method of payment (see e.g. Martynova and Renneboog, 2009; 
Cole and Vu, 2006), financing the transaction with stock or both stock and cash has a 
negative effect on the stock returns as opposed to the cash payment. The overall quality of 
the regression is rather high, with R-squared being 0,28, and F-statistic having a 0,07 
significance. However, an important variable American is highly insignificant in this 
regression, which does not allow drawing any conclusions with respect to the differences in 
the stock returns between American and European mergers.  
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When European and North American transactions are studied separately, the obtained values 
directionally prove that the market reaction is less negative on the North American 
transactions as opposed to the European acquisitions. However, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant, so the results should be treated with caution. Thus, the results of 
regression (5), which is the same as regression (4) excluding the variable American, done on 
the North American mergers is the following (t-values are presented in parenthesis): 
 
(5) MASRi = 1,6% - 0,15 OIi - 0,000001 Valuei – 0,05 Target sizei+  
          (0,42)    (-1,39) (-0,14)             (0,31)   
+ 0,001 Target P/Bi + 0,004 Acquirer P/Bi + 0,03 Stocki – 0,06 Mixedi 
   (0,79)  (0,22)      (0,7)  (-1,67) 
 R-squared = 0,25, F-statistic = 0,91 
 
According to the obtained values, the abnormal short-term stock price return is positive, 
though not statistically significant. Surprisingly, the correlation between the premerger and 
post-merger performance is negative and the effect of stock financing of the transaction is 
positive. However, none of the coefficients in the regression above is statistically significant, 
which makes it impossible to draw reliable conclusions based on it. As for the European 
sample, running the same regression with an addition of variable Cross-border (further 
referred to as regression (6)) provides the following results: 
 
(6) MASRi = 1% + 0,09 OIi - 0,000001 Valuei + 0,04 Target sizei+  
          (0,54)  (1,69) (-1,14)                 (1,49)   
- 0,0004 Target P/Bi + 0,0004 Acquirer P/Bi - 0,02 Stocki – 0,003 Mixedi –  
  (-1,89)        (1,72)         (-0,88)           (-0,10) 
 
- 0,03 Cross-Borderi 
 (-1,06) 
 
 R-squared = 0,42, F-statistic = 1,29 
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All the coefficients in this regressions are directionally what they are expected to be based 
on the previous researches and hypotheses set, though only the operational improvement and 
the price-to-book ratio of the target have a statistically significant effect on the stock returns 
at the 10% level. Payment with stock or both stock and cash causes a more negative reaction 
of the market than payment with cash, which is consistent with the previous studies on the 
subject (see e.g. Martynova and Renneboog, 2009; Cole and Vu, 2006). In addition, the high 
valuation of the target has a negative impact on the stock price return, while the high 
valuation of the acquirer influences it positively; this finding is in line with the other 
researches on this topic too (see e.g. Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Finally, cross-border 
mergers earn smaller returns around the merger announcement, which supports the findings 
by e.g. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005). Overall, the results presented in this section allow 
accepting Hypothesis 2 based both on the total and European sample. 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the data analysis presented in the previous chapter suggest that the market 
reflects the future operational improvements in the stock returns around the announcement. 
In addition, it provides evidence that the operational performance of North American 
companies is superior to the one of European companies, though the coefficient is not 
statistically significant in the given sample size. While the former statement simply supports 
the market efficiency theory and demonstrates that the operational performance 
enhancement is one of the major determinants of the stock price returns on the announcement 
(the value of the coefficient and its significance are the highest among all the independent 
variables on the total and European sample), the latter data deserve a more detailed 
explanation. As mentioned in the Findings chapter, the abnormal cash flow returns on assets 
coefficient is negative for the European companies and statistically significant on the 5% 
level, while the corresponding coefficient of the North American sample is slightly higher, 
but not significant. This fact along with the robustness of the coefficients when verified with 
market-adjusted values sets strong grounds for claiming that performing the same tests on a 
larger American sample would facilitate accepting Hypothesis 1. Since the values obtained 
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are directionally supportive for the hypothesis, it is worth elaborating on the factors that 
could cause such a performance. 
 
According to the views of a number of practitioners (see e.g. European Policy Centre, 2010; 
European Commission, 2015; Miller and Atkinson, 2014), telecommunication industry 
regulation in Europe varies between countries. This fact might be detrimental for the 
operational performance of the companies since entering the new market requires modifying 
the business model and comes at a cost. European Commission (2015) estimates the cost of 
adapting to the national policies for the small and medium companies striving to sell abroad 
to be €9000. These differences in the rules of international data flow and other aspects limit 
the potential of acquisitions, especially the cross-border ones. For domestic mergers, the 
issue of adapting to the policies is raised if the company reaches a sufficient scale to expand 
abroad, while for cross-border transactions it is a crucial aspect of integration. The fact that 
heavily regulated industries in Europe receive lower returns on the merger announcements 
in cross-border transactions than less regulated ones is also proved by academic researches 
(see e.g. Campa and Hernando, 2004). Therefore, the concerns of practitioners in the field 
have a reason behind, and differences in European regulation might be a determinant of 
inferior post-merger operational performance as opposed to North American acquisitions. 
Even though the effects of cross-border acquisitions in Europe is separated by the 
corresponding dummy variable in the present research, the abnormal return could also be 
negatively affected by the regulation problem in case of domestic mergers if the market 
expects that the transaction will lead to expansion abroad. Furthermore, this thesis considers 
the country where the company is registered and not where it operates; therefore, mergers 
between two companies registered in one country but operating internationally in different 
markets could require adapting to national policies as well. This aspect could be studied in 
further researches on the subject. 
 
Another factor that could influence the operational benefits of European acquisitions is 
cultural differences between countries. As mentioned before, despite the free flow of goods 
and labor force in the European Union, the still have distinctive cultural characteristics. This 
fact can make it difficult to adapt the products for international distribution. In addition, 
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traditions in the countries might affect organizational culture and leadership styles. 
According to Miller and Atkinson (2014), differences in leadership styles are one of the 
determinants of the market fragmentation in Europe and reasons behind the European 
telecommunication industry lagging behind the American one. Furthermore, Stahl and Voigt 
(2008) argue that cultural differences negatively affect synergy realization after acquisitions, 
and that they are more influential than organizational culture differences in this respect. This 
statement is reasonable since cross-country cultural peculiarities partly include 
organizational culture, so their effect should be larger. However, this paper does not study 
the exact reasons for the European companies’ underperformance in comparison to the 
American ones. Further researches including the variables for cultural distance, regulation 
differences, and international operations of the companies could be done based on the 
present thesis. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
The thesis aims at studying the performance of European and North American companies 
after mergers and identifying the differences between the operational benefits of acquisitions 
on these continents. In addition, it examines short-term price reaction on the merger 
announcement and tries to find whether the market reaction is positively correlated to the 
future improvements in the efficiency of the merged firms. The thesis contributes to the 
existing literature on the topic in several ways. Firstly, it complements the current research 
on the benefits of mergers and acquisitions by studying it in the light of a relevant and rapidly 
developing industry, which recently started drawing attention of both academics and 
practitioners. Secondly, it enhances the existing studies of the ICT sector by adding a long-
term perspective and examining the real gains from the acquisitions measured in operational 
performance. Thirdly, it contributes to the event studies on stock returns around the merger 
announcement by verifying that the market reflects the future efficiency improvements. 
Lastly, the thesis compares the operational performance of North American and European 
companies, which, to the knowledge of the author, has not been done in the telecom industry 
yet.  
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Hypothesis 1 set in the introduction states that the operational performance of North 
American companies improves more after the mergers than the performance of European 
companies. The present paper cannot accept this hypothesis based on the main indicator used 
to measure it: industry-adjusted pretax operational cash flow returns on the market value of 
assets. Even though directionally the abnormal returns obtained support the hypothesis, it is 
not possible to accept it due to low statistical significance of the coefficients. However, 
verifying the robustness of the values by adjusting the company values with the cash flow 
returns on assets of the total market (North American and European markets for North 
American and European transactions respectively) provides more significant results. The 
post-merger abnormal cash flow return coefficient is considerably lower in Europe after 
controlling for the method of payment, relative size of the target to the acquirer, price-to-
book ratios of the bidder and the target, and the cross-border nature of the transaction. In 
addition, it is statistically significant at the 5% level and holds after a robustness check 
verifying if the changes in the cash flow returns on assets are caused by substantial moves 
of the equity values. However, the lack of statistical significance of the abnormal cash flow 
return of the North American companies does not allow accepting Hypothesis 1. 
Nevertheless, the similarity of the values obtained from industry adjustment and market 
adjustment as well as the high statistical significance of the European coefficient sets strong 
grounds for claiming that in a larger sample, significant results would be obtained. Further 
research on this topic using a greater number of North American transactions is needed to 
draw more reliable conclusions on this subject.  
 
Hypothesis 2 set in the introduction argues that stock performance around the merger 
announcement is positively correlated with improvements in post-merger operational 
performance of the companies. The hypothesis is tested on the total sample as well as North 
American and European transactions separately. It is accepted on the 10% level based on the 
results of the total sample and European mergers, while the corresponding coefficient in the 
American sample is not statistically significant. Even though the significance level is not too 
low, the size of the sample (51 total, 27 North American, and 24 European) allows accepting 
the hypothesis. The obtained result implies that the market reflects the future improvements 
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in the operational efficiency at the merger announcement. The findings of this thesis 
complement the research by Ikäheimo et al (2016) who claim that the superior stock 
performance of the North American companies as opposed to European firms is caused by 
the American acquisitions being more beneficial for the companies. Further studies 
involving the underlying reasons for the European telecom firms’ underperformance 
following the mergers may be based on this paper.  
 
One of the limitations of this study that seems to be hard to overcome is the fact that the 
telecom acquisition market was highly active in 2000-2011, which implies that the vast 
majority of the companies engaged into mergers more than once during the period of 
observations. Therefore, the operational performance data is affected by the mergers 
completed in the years surrounding the sample acquisition. However, a sufficient sample 
size and using median values to avoid large outliers should neutralize the effects of the other 
transactions on the research results and make them unbiased.  
 
Overall, the paper shows that the market reflects the future operational improvements after 
the merger in the stock price around the transaction announcement. The abnormal cash flow 
returns on assets are lower for the North American companies than for the European ones, 
though the result is not statistically significant. The thesis leaves room for further studies 
regarding the underlying factors determining the performance as well as a more detailed 
analysis of the targets and the acquirers separately. Adding the variables regarding cultural 
distance, regulation differences, and international operations of the companies could also 
facilitate gaining statistically significant results on the differences in the operational 
performance between the continents. 
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APPENDIX 1 LIST OF SIC CODES USED IN THE STUDY 
 
26.1 - 26.4 
26.8 
46.5  
4812 
4813 
4822 
4841 
4899 
58.2  
61.1 - 61.9 
62 
63.1 – 63.9  
7375 
95.1 
 
The SIC codes are selected based on the definition of OECD (2002) and the official SIC 
code website (http://siccode.com). 
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APPENDIX 2 LIST OF NORTH AMERICAN TRANSACTIONS 
 
  Date 
Announced 
  Date 
Effective 
Target Name Target 
Nation 
Acquirer Name Acquirer 
 Nation 
05.03.06 29.12.06 BellSouth Corp United 
States 
AT&T Inc United 
States 
22.04.10 01.04.11 Qwest Commun 
Intl Inc 
United 
States 
CenturyLink Inc United 
States 
31.01.05 18.11.05 AT&T Corp United 
States 
SBC 
Communications 
Inc 
United 
States 
23.02.01 30.01.02 UnitedGlobalCom 
Inc 
United 
States 
Liberty Media 
Corp 
United 
States 
27.10.08 01.07.09 Embarq Corp United 
States 
CenturyTel Inc United 
States 
14.02.05 06.01.06 MCI Inc United 
States 
Verizon 
Communications 
Inc 
United 
States 
15.02.00 01.11.00 Teleglobe Inc Canada BCE Inc Canada 
10.01.05 01.08.05 Western Wireless 
Corp 
United 
States 
Alltel Corp United 
States 
13.09.04 13.10.04 Rogers Wireless 
Commun Inc 
Canada Rogers 
Communications 
Inc 
Canada 
29.06.07 15.11.07 Dobson 
Communications 
Corp 
United 
States 
AT&T Inc United 
States 
21.08.00 12.01.01 Clearnet 
Communications 
Inc 
Canada TELUS Corp Canada 
21.11.05 01.02.06 Alamosa Holdings 
Inc 
United 
States 
Sprint Nextel 
Corp 
United 
States 
07.03.06 07.07.06 Aliant Inc Canada Bell Canada Inc Canada 
07.11.08 06.11.09 Centennial 
Communications 
Corp 
United 
States 
AT&T Inc United 
States 
17.09.07 22.02.08 SunCom Wireless 
Holdings Inc 
United 
States 
T-Mobile USA 
Inc 
United 
States 
01.08.11 01.12.11 PAETEC Holding 
Corp 
United 
States 
Windstream 
Corp 
United 
States 
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10.07.05 12.08.05 US Unwired Inc United 
States 
Sprint Nextel 
Corp 
United 
States 
20.04.06 01.07.06 Ubiquitel Inc United 
States 
Sprint Nextel 
Corp 
United 
States 
05.06.00 14.09.00 Primark Corp United 
States 
Thomson Corp Canada 
24.11.09 01.06.10 Iowa Telecom 
Services Inc 
United 
States 
Windstream 
Corp 
United 
States 
07.12.00 02.04.01 Moffat 
Communications 
Ltd 
Canada Shaw 
Communications 
Inc 
Canada 
17.09.06 08.03.07 Commonwealth 
Telephone Entrp 
United 
States 
Citizens 
Communications 
Co 
United 
States 
18.03.04 04.06.04 Allstream Inc Canada Manitoba 
Telecom 
Services Inc 
Canada 
19.10.09 04.12.09 iPCS Inc United 
States 
Sprint Nextel 
Corp 
United 
States 
29.05.07 31.08.07 CT 
Communications 
Inc 
United 
States 
Windstream 
Corp 
United 
States 
28.07.09 24.11.09 Virgin Mobile 
USA Inc 
United 
States 
Sprint Nextel 
Corp 
United 
States 
01.10.10 08.12.10 ITC Deltacom Inc United 
States 
EarthLink Inc United 
States 
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APPENDIX 3 LIST OF EUROPEAN TRANSACTIONS 
 
  Date 
Announced 
  Date 
Effective 
Target Name Target 
Nation 
Acquiror 
Name 
Acquiror 
 Nation 
12.03.03 04.08.03 Telecom Italia 
SpA 
Italy Ing C Olivetti 
& Co SpA 
Italy 
16.03.06 29.07.06 Telefonica 
Moviles SA 
Spain Telefonica SA Spain 
07.12.04 30.06.05 Telecom Italia 
Mobile SpA 
Italy Telecom Italia 
SpA 
Italy 
01.09.03 07.10.03 Orange SA France France 
Telecom SA 
France 
30.05.00 22.08.00 Orange PLC United 
Kingdom 
France 
Telecom SA 
France 
31.10.05 19.04.06 O2 PLC United 
Kingdom 
Telefonica SA Spain 
23.02.04 28.04.04 Wanadoo SA France France 
Telecom SA 
France 
09.10.04 06.06.06 T-Online 
International 
AG 
Germany Deutsche 
Telekom AG 
Germany 
20.12.07 24.06.08 Neuf Cegetel 
SA 
France SFR France 
18.03.00 23.03.00 MobilCom AG Germany France 
Telecom SA 
France 
03.10.05 03.03.06 Telewest 
Global Inc 
United 
Kingdom 
NTL Inc United 
Kingdom 
24.03.02 09.12.02 Sonera Oyj Finland Telia AB Sweden 
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20.11.00 29.06.01 Equant NV Netherlands France 
Telecom SA 
France 
12.04.05 17.06.05 Cesky Telecom 
AS 
Czech 
Republic 
Telefonica SA Spain 
07.09.00 12.01.01 World Online 
International 
NV 
Netherlands Tiscali SpA Italy 
01.12.03 26.01.04 Vodafone-
Panafon 
Hellenic 
Greece Vodafone 
Group PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
11.01.00 10.06.00 Esat Telecom 
Group PLC 
Ireland-Rep BT Hawthorn 
Ltd 
United 
Kingdom 
13.01.03 28.03.03 Europolitan 
Vodafone AB 
Sweden Vodafone 
Group PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
13.01.03 21.05.03 Vodafone 
Telecel-
Comunicacoes 
Portugal Vodafone 
Group PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
24.07.00 02.10.00 Societe 
Europeenne de 
Commun 
Luxembourg NetCom AB Sweden 
17.07.05 01.11.05 Versatel 
Telecom 
International 
Netherlands Tele2 AB Sweden 
28.05.03 25.07.03 Terra Networks 
SA 
Spain Telefonica SA Spain 
10.02.05 15.07.05 Terra Networks 
SA 
Spain Telefonica SA Spain 
08.01.01 03.05.01 Liberty Surf 
Groupe SA 
France Tiscali SpA Italy 
 
 
